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ARTICLE
Equitable Defenses Against the
Government in the Natural Resources and
Environmental Law Context
MARY V. LAITOS, DANIELLE V. SMITH, and AMY E. MANG*
INTRODUCTION
When the government brings an action against a private citi-
zen or entity, possible defenses include (i) estoppel; (ii) delay-
based defenses such as laches, waiver, and unclean hands; and
(iii) statutes of limitations. Estoppel, laches, waiver, and unclean
hands are all equity based defenses and, as such, are grounded
upon notions of fairness. Despite that foundation, courts are re-
luctant to allow the application of equitable defenses against the
government when their application would defeat the public inter-
est, even if the result confers an unfair advantage onto the govern-
ment.1 Courts exercise their equitable discretion to decide
whether and for what reasons equitable defenses may be success-
fully asserted against the government. 2 Although different courts
* The authors are from Welborn Sullivan Meck & Tooley, P.C., Denver, Colo-
rado. Mary V. Laitos, a shareholder with the firm, specializes in natural resources,
public lands and commercial litigation. Ms. Laitos graduated from the University of
Denver College of Law with honors in 1988. Danielle V. Smith, a firm associate, spe-
cializes in litigation and graduated from the Ohio State University School of Law in
1997. Amy E. Mang, also an associate with the firm, specializes in corporate and
natural resources law with emphasis in business transactions. Ms. Mang received
her J.D. from William and Mary in 1997.
1. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d 913, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1975); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Rosenfeld, 1997
WL 400131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
2. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). Note that Congress
has the authority to preempt a court's equitable discretion through legislative action.
Congress has exercised that authority by restricting the court's equitable jurisdiction
in some of the environmental regulations it has promulgated. For example, the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")
mandates liability "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
1
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rely on varying policy considerations, courts generally define the
public interest very broadly, making it difficult to successfully pre-
vail on these defenses against the government. 3
A private party has a better chance of asserting a statute of
limitations defense against the government than an equitable de-
fense. 4 Separation of powers is not a concern in statute of limita-
tions cases because Congress has acted to legislate in the
challenged area. 5 The legal analysis for statutes of limitations is
also distinguishable because it invokes statutory construction
principles. The ambiguities inherent in general statutes of limita-
tion, intended to cover an enormous array of governmental agency
claims, can cause significant or impossible hurdles for the practi-
tioner to overcome. 6
This paper discusses these defenses and provides suggestions
to the practitioner asserting them. The discussion is intended to
offer guidance to practitioners defending against government ac-
tions. It does not constitute an exhaustive analysis of all the is-
sues or cases involved in the application of equitable defenses
against the government. Instead, the discussion sets forth gen-
eral principles and highlights cases in the natural resources and
environmental law context which illustrate these principles. Al-
though the focus of this paper is on suits involving the federal gov-
ernment and its agencies, actions involving states and state
agencies are discussed as well.
(1994). Congress's intent in imposing strict liability notwithstanding equitable de-
fenses that may be present was to enforce the public policy of assuring that responsi-
ble parties bear the costs of hazardous waste cleanup.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F.Supp. 397, 427 (D.N.J. 1991); Shokal
v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985) (quoting Young & Horten v. Hinderlider, 110
P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910)).
4. See, e.g., Brock E. Czeschin, United States v. Navistar International Transpor-
tation Corp.: Seventh Circuit Bars Government's CERCLA Claim Based on Violation
of the Statute of Limitations, 10 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 399, 402 (1999).
5. See, e.g., James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Viola-
tion Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Environmental Penalty
Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 593 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Roger M. Klein, The Continuing Nature of Notification Violation
under Environmental Statutes, 26 ENVTL. LAW 565, 586 (1996).
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THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST APPLYING
ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
I. Introduction
Estoppel is a doctrine based on principles of fair dealing.7 It
prevents a party from assuming inconsistent positions to the det-
riment of another party.8 The doctrine of estoppel is a response to
the unfairness inherent in denying a party some benefit after the
party has reasonably relied on the misrepresentations of an ad-
verse party.9 In order to successfully assert the defense of estop-
pel, a party must show: (i) the government had knowledge of the
facts; (ii) the government intended that its conduct be acted upon
or acted in a manner so that the party asserting the defense had a
right to believe it so intended; (iii) the party asserting the defense
was ignorant of the true facts; and (iv) that party relied on the
government's conduct to his or her detriment.10
The argument for applying estoppel against the government
is supported by two equitable goals. First, the government should
be prevented from taking unconscionable advantage of its own
wrong. 1' Second, the government should be prevented from as-
7. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Dean, Equitable Estoppel Against the Government - The
Missouri Experience: Time to Rethink the Concept, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63 (1992);
Randy L. Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the United States,
27 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 41 (1981); Fred Ansell, Comment Unauthorized Conduct
of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule of Equitable Estoppel Against the Govern-
ment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1026 (1986); Michael Cameron Pitou, Equitable Estoppel: Its
Genesis, Development and Application in Governmental Contracting, 19 PUB. CoNT.
L.J. 606 (1990); Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break
Their Own "Laws", 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985); Uisdean R. Vass and Margaret A. Nun-
nery, Estoppel of the Government to Collect Mineral Royalties: A Blind Alley, 28
TULSA L.J. 409 (1993); Kenneth M. Williams, Office of Personnel Management v. Rich-
mond: Estopping the Government - A Brighter Line? 1 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 455
(1992); Frederick S. Kuhlman, Comment, Government Estoppel: The Search for Con-
stitutional Limits, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 229 (1991); Deborah Walrath, Note, Recent
Developments in Administrative Law: Liability of Administrative Agencies and Offi-
cials: Estopping the Federal Government: Still Waiting for the Right Case, 53 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 191 (1985).
8. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970). See
also Jan G. Laitos, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS OF GOVERN-
MENT POWERS § 3.03 (1999).
9. See United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1348 (5th Cir.
1996).
10. See Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 96 (citing Hampton v. Paramount Pic-
tures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960)).
11. See id.
2000]
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serting legal rights where such an assertion would work a fraud or
injustice on a private party acting in good faith.12
Asserting a successful estoppel defense against the govern-
ment is, to say the least, difficult.13 It is well-settled in Supreme
Court precedent that "equitable estoppel will not lie against the
Government as it lies against private litigants."1 4 While the Su-
preme Court has never placed a definitive bar upon the applica-
tion of estoppel against the government, its consistent reversal of
the application of the doctrine against the government has not
been encouraging to defendants. 15 Rather, estoppel against the
government is applied "with great reluctance.' 16
As discussed below, courts have used various tools to analyze
whether estoppel should lie against the government, including (i)
public policies, such as the separation of powers doctrine and a
balancing test of the public and private interest; (ii) a strict analy-
sis of whether the defendant suffered detriment and whether de-
fendant's reliance on the government was reasonable; (iii)
determining whether the government engaged in affirmative mis-
conduct; and (iv) determining whether the government was acting
in its proprietary or sovereign capacity.' 7
II. Public Policies Enforced in Government Estoppel Cases
A. Separation of Powers
1. Introduction
One of the responsibilities of the federal judiciary is to main-
tain the separation of powers among the three branches of govern-
ment.' 8 In estoppel cases involving the government, courts are
concerned with invading the legislative province of Congress by
12. See Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1348.
13. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Dean, Equitable Estoppel Against the Government - The
Missouri Experience: Time to Rethink the Concept, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 70 (1992).
14. See Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990).
See also Heckler v. Community Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60
(1984); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1917).
15. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419; See also Frederick S. Kuhlman, Comment,
Government Estoppel: The Search for Constitutional Limits, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 229,
230 (1991).
16. See United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nimmo, 695 F.2d 1251, 1259 (10th Cir.
1982); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1158, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Matthew J. Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court:
One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 966 (1995).
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allowing "government employees to 'legislate' by misinterpreting
or ignoring an applicable statute or regulation." 19 In validating
unauthorized "legislation" that is contrary to the governing law,
courts are infringing upon Congress' constitutionally exclusive au-
thority to make law.20 The importance of separation of powers to
the operation of a limited government, often leads a court to reject
a claim for estoppel when a party is seeking to estop the enforce-
ment of a statute or regulation. 21
The concern for the separation of powers has been a decisive
factor in many lower court decisions. 22 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized that its refusal to invade the legislating au-
thority of Congress can sometimes result in a serious hardship to
the party who relied on the misinformation supplied by the gov-
ernment agent,23 it has stated that "'not even the temptations of a
hard case' will provide a basis for ordering recovery contrary to
the terms of the regulation, for to do so would disregard 'the duty
of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress."' 24
Thus, the separation of powers concern permits the use of the es-
toppel defense only in cases where "it does not interfere with un-
derlying government policies or unduly undermine the correct
enforcement of a particular law or regulation."25
2. Application of the Separation of Powers Doctrine:
Unauthorized Governmental Action
a. Unauthorized Payments
Courts enforce the separation of powers doctrine through a
rejection of an equitable defense when the result would compel
governmental action unauthorized by the legislature. 26 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply estoppel
when it would require the government to make payments which
19. See Portmann, 674 F.2d at 1159.
20. Id.
21. See Ansell, supra note 7, at 1036-38.
22. See, e.g., Double J. Land & Cattle Co., v. United States Dep't of Interior, 91
F.3d 1378 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that estoppel should only be applied against the
government when its application "would not frustrate the purpose of the statutes ex-
pressing the will of Congress") (citations omitted); Transohio Savings Bank v. Direc-
tor, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
23. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 332 U.S. at 385.
24. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 420 (discussing and quoting Federal Crop Ins. Corp.,
332 U.S. at 385-86).
25. Browning, 630 F.2d at 702.
26. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 434; See also Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of
New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1997).
2000]
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have not been authorized by the government.27 The Supreme
Court recently drew a bright line in this area by stating: "[Tihe
equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant respondent a money
remedy that Congress has not authorized. '28
b. Unauthorized Acts of Individual Government
Officials
Courts have also enforced the separation of powers doctrine
by refusing to apply estoppel when the result would be that mis-
deeds and unauthorized acts of individual government officials
would compel governmental action unauthorized by Congress. 29
In the seminal case of Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,30
a utility company argued that the government should be estopped
from objecting to the improvements it had made on public land
without a permit or license from the Secretary of Interior or the
Secretary of Agriculture because government officials had assured
the company that no permits or licenses were necessary. 31 The
Court rejected the argument, stating:
[I]t is enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor
estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an ar-
rangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law
does not sanction or permit ... [Nieglect of duty on the part of
officers of the government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce
a public right or protect a public interest.32
More recent cases have continued to follow the precedent of
Utah Power. For example, in Christmann & Welborn v. Depart-
ment of Energy,33 the court held that statements of a Department
of Interior employee regarding mandatory petroleum price regula-
tions could not bind the government where the regulations pro-
vided that agency interpretation must be in writing.34
The corollary to the rule that unauthorized acts cannot bind
the government is that agents acting within their authority may
27. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at 434.
28. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 426.
29. See generally Ansell, supra note 7; Kuhlman, supra note 7; Williams, supra
note 7.
30. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 409.
33. 773 F.2d 317, 320 (T.E.C.A. 1985).
34. See id.
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bind the government.35 The case of United States v. Eaton Shale
Co.,36 illustrates this point. In Eaton Shale, the government
brought a suit to invalidate and cancel a patent based upon oil
shale placer mining claims that it had mistakenly issued more
than twenty-one years earlier. 37 The court found that the govern-
ment was estopped from asserting its claim based on the fact that
when the patent was issued, the government agency had acted
within its authority and in accordance with its prescribed duties. 38
c. Unauthorized Acts of Individual Government
Officials: The State Context
In the state context, courts are also reluctant to apply estop-
pel when the acts of individual governmental officials would com-
pel governmental action unauthorized by law. For example, in
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Ken-
tucky Harlan Coal Co., Inc.,39the Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection Cabinet issued a notice of compliance to the
operator of a coal washing plant in 1981 for illegally dumping
processing waste outside the areas authorized by its permits.40
The proceeding was eventually dismissed on the ground that the
operator had not violated the applicable law.41 Five years later, in
1986, a notice of noncompliance was issued and a penalty was as-
sessed after the operator was seen dumping waste rock materials
into a residential site on two different occasions. 42 On appeal, the
operator argued that the government should be estopped from
pursuing the enforcement action because the 1981 cessation no-
tice, assessed for the same or similar conduct as the 1986 viola-
tion, had been dismissed. 43 However, the court rejected the
operator's argument, stating that "a public officer's failure 'to cor-
rectly administer the law does not prevent a more diligent and
35. See, e.g, United States v. Eaton Shale Co., 433 F.Supp. 1256 (D. Colo. 1977);
Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton, 370 F.Supp. 108, 125 (D. Colo. 1973) (stating that "the
government can be estopped by the conduct of its agents, within the scope of their
authority." Id.) (Emphasis added).
36. 433 F.Supp. 1256 (N.D. Colo. 1977).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1272.
39. 870 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1994).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
20001 279
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efficient' officer's proper administration of the law, as '[a] n errone-
ous interpretation of the law will not be perpetuated."' 44
However, at least one court has found that a state can be es-
topped based on the representations of a state attorney. In Zufall
v. Department of Environmental Resources,45 plaintiffs were the
owners of a tract of land which subsequently became subject to a
declaration of taking.46 The declaration of taking excluded all oil
and gas and mining rights.47 Plaintiffs thereafter leased the oil
and gas rights under the tract which had been condemned, but the
state refused to permit the lessee to drill for the oil and gas.48 The
plaintiffs filed an action seeking to enjoin the state from claiming
any ownership interest in the oil and gas rights in the property. 49
In a prior action relating to the amount of damages that should be
awarded as a result of the taking, the state attorney had repre-
sented that the taking did not include any mineral rights. 50 Plain-
tiffs argued that the state attorney's representations estopped the
state from thereafter claiming that it owned the mineral rights.
The court agreed with plaintiffs, holding that the state should be
estopped from asserting ownership to the mineral rights "in light
of the clear assertions made by the Commonwealth's attorney con-
cerning the oil and gas rights."51
B. The Balancing Test: Public Interest v. Private Interest
1. Introduction
In addition to giving great deference to the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, many courts engage in a balancing test to determine
44. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Kentucky
Harlan Coal Co., Inc., 870 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Ky. 1994) (quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14, 20 (Ky. 1985)). But see Durell
v. Miles, 206 P.2d 547 (N.M. 1949). (In that case, the Commissioner of Public Lands
of the State of New Mexico cancelled plaintiffs oil and gas leases because of failure to
pay annual rentals. The plaintiff brought suit to rescind the cancellation of the
leases, arguing that the state should be estopped from canceling the leases because of
misrepresentations made by the Commissioner regarding when the leases would be
canceled. Although the case was decided in favor of plaintiff on other grounds and
thus the court did not find it necessary to decide the estoppel issue, the court stated:
"[T]here are strong equities favoring the plaintiff who ... was advised by the commis-
sioner that his leases could not be legally cancelled" until a later date.) Id. at 550.
45. 590 A.2d 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Zufall, 590 A.2d at 812.
51. Id. at 816.
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8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/2
EQUITABLE DEFENSES
whether the application of estoppel would result in "a serious in-
justice outweighing the damage to the public interest of estopping
the government."52 Not surprisingly, the scales usually tip in
favor the government. As one court has stated, "The possibility of
harm to a private party inherent in denying equitable estoppel is
often (if not always) grossly outweighed by the pressing public in-
terest in the enforcement of congressionally mandated public
policy."53
This type of balancing test is illustrated in Union Oil Co. of
California v. Morton.5 4 In Union Oil, the Secretary of the Interior
granted oil and gas leases to four oil companies allowing them to
construct drilling platforms in the Santa Barbara Channel. 55 Two
such platforms were constructed and one application pending for a
third when a major blowout occurred on one of the platforms,
causing serious ecological, economic and environmental damage. 56
The government then notified the oil companies that another plat-
form would not be permitted.57 The companies objected and as-
serted estoppel based on the terms of the lease.58 The court
balanced the interests of the public against the interests of the oil
companies and rejected the defense, finding that the costs to the
public could be enormous if the government were estopped from
maintaining vigorous regulation of the oil companies' drilling,
while in contrast, the costs to the oil companies were "merely" the
loss of anticipated profits.59
2. Public Land Cases
The balancing test approach to estoppel claims has also
clearly favored the public interest in cases involving public lands.
In United States v. California,6 0 the government brought suit
against the State of California alleging that California executed
numerous mineral leases with private parties relating to lands lo-
cated off the coast of California, which the United States claimed
52. Bolt v. United States, 944 F.2d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1991); See Dean, supra note
13, at 103.
53. United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985).
54. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 749, n. 2.
60. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
2000]
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it owned. 61 The Supreme Court held that despite the conduct of
the federal government's agents in conducting its affairs, includ-
ing denying oil and gas leases in the California coastal belt on the
assumption that California owned the lands, the government was
not estopped from asserting its rights with respect to the lands.62
While California involved a state government defendant, not a
private party, the Supreme Court still held that in cases involving
the potential loss of public lands, the federal government, as trus-
tee of those lands, would have the superior interests. 63 Specifi-
cally, the Court stated:
The Government, which holds its interests here ... in trust for
all the people, is not deprived of those interests by the ordinary
court rules designed particularly for private disputes over indi-
vidually owned pieces of property; and officers who have no au-
thority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their
conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by
their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.6 4
There is however, at least one case in which the government
has been estopped from complaining of trespass on public lands.
In United States v. Wharton,65 the Interior Board of Land Appeals
denied a patent under the Color of Title Act, which authorizes
claims of adverse possession against the United States under lim-
ited circumstances. 66 The defendant claimed the government
should be estopped from claiming title to the land based on mis-
representations made by officers of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment.67 In accepting the estoppel argument, the court conducted
the balancing test and found that the government's conduct would
work a serious injustice to the party in the case because defendant
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. California, 332 U.S. at 40. See also Utah Power., 243 U.S. at 409 ("A suit by
the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in
trust for all the people stands upon a different plane ... from the ordinary private
suit ... "); United States v. Osterlund, 671 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1982) ("courts
have no power to adjust the parties' equities in determining title to federal lands"
because Congress alone determines how to manage public lands.); United States v.
Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Wlhile one may be sympathetic with
the landowners in this case, we must not be unmindful that the land involved belongs
to all the people of the United States.").
65. 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
66. See 43 U.S.C. § 1068 (1994).
67. See Wharton, 514 F.2d 406.
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had lived on and worked the land for over 55 years.68 The court
further found that the interest of the public would not be unduly
threatened or damaged by granting defendant the opportunity to
obtain the relevant tract of land because, in part, the government
would benefit once defendant gained title to the land and started
paying taxes.69 This case, however, seems to be an anomaly in an
overwhelming body of law in which courts have not sacrificed the
public interest under the facts of "a hard case."70
3. Environmental Cleanup Cases
In addition to the hurdles imposed in public land cases, a de-
fendant will also have a difficult time showing that a private harm
outweighs the public interest in environmental actions where the
government is seeking reimbursement for recovery costs of
cleanup actions. One court has stated that in the context of ac-
tions brought by the government for recovery of costs incurred in
the connection with cleanup of hazardous waste sites, the defen-
dant must overcome the public interests in: (i) ensuring the proper
disposal of hazardous wastes; and (ii) recovering expended funds
for use in recovery actions. 71 The public interests in environmen-
tal recovery actions impose an almost insurmountable barrier to
an estoppel defense.
4. The Balancing Test in the State Context
Courts also examine the public and private interests at stake
when determining whether to apply estoppel in the state context.
Estoppel will not generally lie against the State when its applica-
tion would defeat the public interest. 72 In the natural resources
context, the public interest in the conservation of natural re-
68. See id.
69. It should be noted that this case was decided before the passage of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994), in which Congress
expressed an intent that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as
a result of the land planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that
disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest..." Id. at § 1701(a)(1).
70. See id.
71. United States v. Mottolo, 695 F.Supp. 615, 628 n.13 (D.N.H. 1988). Although
this case involved the cleanup of hazardous waste sites under CERCLA, these public
interests would carry over into virtually any of the environmental statutes.
72. See State Highway Comm'n v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification Ass'n,
784 P.2d 588, 592 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Big Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and
Gas Conservation Comm'n, 715 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 1986)).
2000] 283
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sources has been called a "matter of paramount concern." 73 In Big
Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Comm'n,74 an oil and gas company appealed an order issued by
the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission which re-
stricted production from its gas wells in order to prevent the waste
of hydrocarbons from an adjoining unit.75 In its appeal of the deci-
sion, the company argued that the Commission had a duty to in-
vestigate to determine if waste was occurring, and that its failure
to do so for eighteen years resulted in an estoppel. 76 The Wyo-
ming Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of estoppel,
holding that estoppel should not be invoked "where it would serve
to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
public."77 The court noted the specific statutory prohibition
against the waste of oil and gas and determined that the public
interest in the conservation laws was a matter of paramount
concern.
78
Obtaining full value from state leases has also been deemed
to be an important public policy such that estoppel does not ap-
ply.79 In Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and
Forestry,8 0 the State of Utah leased lands for the mining of coal.
The leases required that the lessee pay a royalty to the state in an
amount equal to the higher of (i) 15 cents per ton; or (ii) the pre-
vailing rate for federal lessees of land.81 The lessees continued to
pay the state a royalty in an amount equal to 15 cents per ton
even after the federal coal lease royalty rate had surpassed 15
cents per ton.8 2 When the state demanded payment from the les-
sees for delinquent royalties, the Utah Supreme Court held that
the state was not estopped from obtaining royalty payments at the
prevailing federal rate because the application of estoppel would
73. Big Piney, 715 P.2d at 559 (quoting Edgar v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 90
S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)).
74. Big Piney, 715 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1986).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 560.
78. See also State Air Resources Bd. v. Wilmshurst, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 221 (Cal. App.
1999) (holding that the state's strong public policy in protecting air quality precluded
the application of estoppel).
79. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d
720 (Utah 1990).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
284 [Vol. 17
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/2
EQUITABLE DEFENSES
contravene the public policy of the state to recover full value from
the lease of school trust land. 3
III. Elements of Estoppel
A. Introduction
As stated earlier, in order to be successful on a claim on estop-
pel, a defendant is required to show: (i) The government had
knowledge of the facts; (ii) the government intended that its con-
duct be acted upon or acted in a manner so that the party assert-
ing the defense had a right to believe it so intended; (iii) the party
asserting the defense was ignorant of the true facts; and (iv) that
party relied on the government's conduct to his or her detriment.8 4
Thus, "the party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its ad-
versary's conduct 'in such a manner as to change his position for
the worse"' and "that reliance must have been reasonable in that
the party claiming the estoppel did not know nor should it have
known that its adversary's conduct was misleading."8 5
The first three elements of estoppel are relatively straightfor-
ward and have warranted little discussion in the case law. How-
ever, courts routinely focus on whether detriment existed and
whether the defendant's reliance was reasonable.8 6
B. The Requirement of Detriment
In determining whether to apply estoppel, courts often focus
on whether the party asserting the defense has relied on the gov-
ernment's misinformation to his or her detriment.8 7 Detrimental
reliance may be present in cases in which the party claiming es-
toppel is deprived of something he or she is entitled to by right.8 8
The Supreme Court has suggested that detrimental reliance can-
not be established where the party asserting estoppel received a
83. See id.
84. See Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 96 (citing Hampton, 279 F.2d at 104). For
a more in-depth discussion of the traditional elements of estoppel, see Kuhlman,
supra note 7, at n. 34.
85. See Heckler, 467 U.S. at 51, 58 (1984). See also Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, § 90 cmt. A (1981) ("Estoppel prevents a person from showing the truth con-
trary to a representation of fact made by him after another has relied on the
representation.").
86. See, e.g., Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 181 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999).
87. See, e.g., Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1980); Richmond, 996
U.S. at 433.
88. See, e.g., New York Inst. of Dietetics v. Riley, 966 F.Supp. 1300, 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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benefit that he or she was not entitled to receive.8 9 This situation
occurs when the government confers a benefit, commonly a mone-
tary benefit, to a party that is not entitled it.90 For example, the
Supreme Court rejected a claim of estoppel in Heckler v. Commu-
nity Health Serv. of Crawford County, Inc.,91 where the plaintiff
was attempting to estop the government from recouping overpay-
ments that it had mistakenly made under Medicare cost reim-
bursement procedures. 92 The court found that "the consequences
of the government's misconduct were not entirely adverse" be-
cause respondent had received "an immediate benefit as a result
of the double reimbursement."93
Similarly, in United States v. Mottolo,94 the government
brought an action under CERCLA to recover costs incurred in con-
nection with the cleanup of a hazardous waste site from the owner
and operator of the site.95 The defendants asserted the defense of
estoppel, arguing that they gave consent to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to enter their site based on the EPA's
representations that it would not seek response costs. 96 The court
denied the estoppel defense, holding that the defendants could not
establish detrimental reliance because the EPA did not need de-
fendants' consent to enter the site where it was already afforded
that authority under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act. 97
C. The Requirement of Reasonableness
1. Reliance on Oral Representations of Government
Officials is Unreasonable
The issue of detrimental reliance is a difficult hurdle for a
party to overcome where the party has relied upon representa-
tions of a government agent. Courts have consistently found that
reliance on oral representations of a government official is unrea-
sonable, 98 especially in cases where the regulation or statute at
89. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 61-62.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 62. Note, however, that the Court's primary justification for denying the
estoppel claim was in protection of the public fisc. See id. at 63.
94. 695 F.Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. Environmental Waste Control
Inc., 917 F.2d 327, 334 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that reliance on information provided
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issue provides that any agency interpretation must be provided in
writing.99 When dealing with the issue of reliance on a misstate-
ment about a regulation or statute, courts have relied heavily on
the principle that all citizens, especially citizens dealing with the
government, are presumed to know the law.100 The application of
this principle has resulted in almost a per se prohibition on find-
ing that reliance on a government employee's statement was rea-
sonable if a statute or regulation provides the correct
information.101
In United States v. Marine Shale Processors,10 2 the govern-
ment brought an action alleging, in part, that the defendant
stored hazardous waste without a permit or without interim sta-
tus in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). 10 3 The defendant asserted the defense of estoppel, argu-
ing that it relied on statements in a letter sent to it by the Louisi-
ana Department of Environmental Quality to the effect that it did
by a government hotline is not reasonable); See also Christmann & Welborn v. De-
partment of Energy, 773 F.2d 317, 320 (T.E.C.A. 1985) (noting that the information
relied upon had been given orally).
99. See Christmann & Welborn, 773 F.2d at 320 (discussing authority of agent to
bind the government).
100. See, e.g., Heckler, 467 U.S. at 63-64 (...[Tihose who deal with the Govern-
ment are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government
agents contrary to law."); Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1349 ("Courts consider-
ing estoppel claims against the government involving an official's misstatement that a
particular statute or regulation does not apply to the claimant have read the element
of reasonable reliance in light of the principle that all citizens, especially citizens deal-
ing with the government, are presumed to know the law."); Trapper Mining Inc. v.
Lujan, 923 F.2d 774 (10'" Cir. 1991) ("A party who enters into an arrangement with
the government and relies on an official's interpretation of the law 'assume [s] the risk
that that interpretation [is] in error" Id.).
101. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States Dept. of Energy, 772 F.Supp. 654,
662 (D.D.C. 1991) (government was not estopped by the actions of the DOE because it
had reason to know that it had to comply with the published DOE regulations); See
also Environmental Waste Control, 917 F.2d at 334 (defendant's reliance on informa-
tion provided by a government hotline was not reasonable in light of the clarity of the
regulations). One court made a distinction from this general rule to apply the defense
of estoppel and stated that this rule "has less impact . . . when those persons are
dependent upon a governmental agency to interpret its own complex body of rules and
regulations." Tosco Corp. v. Hodel, 611 F.Supp. 1130, 1204 (D. Colo. 1985), vacated
826 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1987). However, a compelling factor in that case was that the
government was changing its position after consistently taking a different position for
more than twenty-eight years. See id. While the decision has since been vacated, it
indicates a certain leniency where the equities weigh heavily in favor of defendant.
See id.
102. 81 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. See id.
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have interim status.10 4 The court rejected the argument, finding
that 42 U.S.C. § 2925(3) provided "clear guidance" regarding in-
terim status and there was no excuse for defendant's failure to
read the statute. 10 5
2. The Duty to Inquire
Reliance on a position of the government has also been held to
be unreasonable where the party has a "duty to inquire" into the
accuracy of the position based on other facts within its knowledge.
For example, in United States v. Menominee, Mich., 06 the court
found that the defendant's reliance on a new permit under the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System issued in 1979 was
unreasonable in light of the notices sent by the state informing
defendant that it was not in compliance with a 1973 permit, as
well as the defendant's knowledge that the EPA could veto a pro-
posed permit incorporated into a consent judgment.10 7 In re-
jecting defendant's claim for estoppel, the court stated:
Under all these circumstances, [defendant] had a duty to
make some inquiry as to whether its activities were in fact gov-
erned by the 1979 or 1973 permit. [Defendant] is a sophisti-
cated corporate player, represented by experienced counsel,
heavily involved in activities that are pervasively regulated by
both Michigan and [the EPA]. It is disingenuous for [defendant]
to now assert, in its words, that it simply 'assumed all was well'
with the 1979 permit despite the signs that [the EPA] might in-
sist on the continuing applicability of the 1973 permit.'0 8
A party's duty to inquire into the accuracy of the information
supplied by the government may therefore preclude a defense of
estoppel.
3. Reasonable Reliance in the State Context
In cases involving a state or state agency, courts have also
been reluctant to find that a party actually relied on the state's
conduct and that such reliance was reasonable. 10 9 For example, in
104. See id.
105. Id. at 1350.
106. 727 F.Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1122.
109. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Goldzband, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 826 (Cal. App. 1997)
(The court found that plaintiff could not establish reliance on state's failure to timely
address idle and abandoned oil and gas wells because plaintiff had no interest in the
[Vol. 17288
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Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah Div. of State Lands and For-
estry,110 two coal companies brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
regarding the royalty rate due under a coal lease.111 The coal
lease at issue provided that the lessee would pay royalties at the
higher of 15 cents per ton or the rate prevailing for federal lessees
of land of similar character prevailing under coal leases issued by
the United States at that time. 112 In 1984, the state began an
audit of coal leases and discovered that in 1977 the royalty rates
on newly issued federal coal leases had been increased to 8%, but
the lessee had not reported or paid the higher rates on their state
leases. 1 3 The lessee argued that the state should be estopped
from asserting an 8% royalty rate because personnel from the
Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry told the lessee that
under the alternative rate provision in the lease, it should pay the
same rate as it was paying the federal government under its fed-
eral lease at the same mine, which was 17.5 cents royalty.1 1 4 The
Supreme Court of Utah held that the lessee did not reasonably
rely on the Division's representations because: (i) the lessee's only
action to determine the correct royalty rate was to talk to employ-
ees of the Division; (ii) the lessee never sought a written decision
from the State Land Board regarding the proper royalty rate; and
(iii) although the lessee was aware of the existence of the 8% roy-
alty rate for federal coal leases, the lessee had failed to disclose it
to the State Land Board and the Utah Division of State Lands, or
obtain a clarification from them. 1 5 This case is significant in that
it shows how difficult it is to assert estoppel against the state even
if the state's position directly contradicts its earlier represen-
tations.
wells during the period of the state's inaction); See also Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 921 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1996) (The Alaska Supreme
Court rejected a claim for estoppel in a state action brought to collect past-due royalty
payments by holding that the lessee's reliance on the failure of the Department of
Natural Resources to object to its method of calculation of royalties was not reasona-
ble given that both the Department of Natural Resources regulations and the terms of
the leases themselves specifically provided that the Department of Natural Resources
had a right to audit the royalty payments.).
110. 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d 514.
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D. The "Fifth Element": Affirmative Misconduct
1. Introduction
In several cases, the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta
that estoppel may lie where the government agent has engaged in
some sort of "affirmative misconduct."1 16  Lower courts have
latched onto this language and incorporated the requirement of
affirmative misconduct as a "fifth element" for a successful estop-
pel defense. 117 As one commentator points out, and the cases re-
veal, the requirement of this additional element in government
cases severely limits the application of the doctrine because there
are few cases in which government agencies have intentionally
misled the public.118
2. The Requirement of Affirmative Action
The case law has clearly established that the government offi-
cial must act affirmatively in order for the court to make a finding
of affirmative misconduct. Indeed, modern courts are clear that
they are looking for facts that establish an "active or intentional
concealment." 1 9 Thus, negligent,1 20 indifferent or passive con-
duct of the government official will not be found to rise to the level
of affirmative misconduct.' 2 ' The government's reluctance to be of
116. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973);
See also Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961). For a discussion of the
development of the affirmative misconduct concept, see Pitou, supra note 7, at 638-47
(1990); See also Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Guy, 978 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1992); Bolt, 944
F.2d at 609 ; Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Sheyenne Tooling & Mfg. Co., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1414, 1419 (D.N.D. 1996). See also
Braunstein, supra note 7, Kuhlman supra note 7.
118. See Kuhlmann, supra note 7, at 257.
119. United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F.Supp. 1122, 1139-40 (D. Colo.
1987) (citations omitted). But see Floyd Higgins, 147 IBLA 343, 6FS Min 22 (1999)
(holding that BLM is estopped to cancel unpatented mining claims where failure to
timely file assesments was created by BLM administrative errors. The Interim Board
of Land Appeals found that the BLM's action, while not malicious or ill intended,
constituted concealment of material facts within the meaning of estoppel doctrine.)
120. See, e.g., Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1329; Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
682 F.Supp. at 1139-40.
121. See, e.g., United States v. City of Toledo, 867 F.Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Ohio
1994) ("Although the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used in circumstances of
deliberate and egregious miconduct where a governmental agency has acted affirma-
tively, it is not available where the agency has simply acted in an indifferent, passive,
or negligent manner."); Menominee, 727 F.Supp. at 1121-22 (inaction on the part of
the EPA "in the face of known NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System] permit violations is not affirmative misconduct upon which equitable estop-
pel will lie."); If a jurisdiction does not consider affirmative misconduct to be a fifth
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss2/2
EQUITABLE DEFENSES
assistance does not amount to affirmative misconduct.122 Fur-
thermore, affirmative misconduct will not be found where the gov-
ernment has merely failed to inform a party of the possibility of, or
actual, violation of a regulation 123 or to apprise the public of regu-
lations which are easily accessible to the public. 124 For example,
in United States v. Eastern of New Jersey, Inc.,125 the court held
that the government did not engage in affirmative misconduct
when it failed both to apprise the defendant of the regulations
promulgated under RCRA and to assist the defendant in comply-
ing with the regulations. 126
Basically, courts are reluctant to find affirmative misconduct
where the result would be to impose a duty on the government
official that is not set forth under the statutes promulgated by
Congress. 127 In reaching this result, courts are undoubtedly
mindful of the separation of powers doctrine. The converse of this
policy occurs in the rare instance when a government official fails
to comply with an affirmative duty to act imposed by statute or
otherwise. 128 In this circumstance, affirmative misconduct may
be found. That was the holding of Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv. ,129 (2nd Cir. 1971), where the court
found affirmative misconduct when a government agent failed to
comply with his statutory duty to inform the petitioner of certain
restrictions on her visa.
element to estoppel, inaction may be the basis for application of the doctrine. For
example, in USA Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 821 F.2d 622, 625 (Fed. Cir.
1987), the government brought an action to recoup overpayments made on a contract
for the purchase of petroleum. The court found that the government's failure to in-
form defendant of problems with measurement of oil delivered for six months was
"inequitable" and "egregious" and the court applied the doctrine of estoppel based on
the government's inaction. Id.
122. See Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d at 761.
123. See United States v. Eastern of New Jersey, Inc., 770 F.Supp. 964, 983-84
(D.N.J. 1991) (holding that the government's failure to inform defendant that it had
violated RCRA did not constitute a misrepresentation); See also Gilmore v. Lujan, 947
F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991) (BLM's failure to inform defendant that it would be
denying his non-conforming oil and gas lease application did not rise to the level of
affirmative misconduct).
124. Id. at 984.
125. 770 F.Supp. 964 (D.N.J. 1991).
126. See id.
127. See Sun I1 Yoo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1976).
128. See, e.g., Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d
301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1971).
129. 532 F.2d 301, 306-07.
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3. The Requirement of Ill Intent
Recent cases indicate that courts are looking for some type of
ill intent on behalf of the government official in order to find af-
firmative misconduct. 130 For example, in United States v. City of
Toledo,' 3 ' the United States EPA and Ohio EPA brought suit
against the City of Toledo, alleging that the city's wastewater
treatment plant was operated in violation of the Clean Water
Act. 132 Prior to bringing the suit, the Director of the Ohio EPA
issued an administrative enforcement decision which, defendant
argued, excused compliance with the limitations imposed by the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits. 133 On
the basis of this order, defendant asserted the defense of estoppel,
arguing that once it had been excused from compliance with the
Director's decision, it was entitled to rely on that excuse and could
not later be held accountable for its actions.134 With respect to the
element of affirmative misconduct, the court stated:
The record in this case shows, at worst, inaction on the part of
the EPA and State EPA, despite awareness of the circumstances
and the risks that they posed for the City and similarly situated
permit holders. That inaction was not, however, purposefully
undertaken to cause harm or injury to the City. It reflects,
rather, the difficulties encountered by the agencies as they
sought to resolve complex regulatory and policy issues.135
Not surprisingly, presenting evidence of intentional conduct
on the part of the government may be the biggest hurdle for an
estoppel defense as it is uncommon for a government official to act
130. See, e.g., Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970) (the court made a find-
ing of affirmative misconduct based on notions of fairness rather than intentional
conduct. The court found that misinformation supplied by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement ("BLM") was sufficient to estop the government because it constituted advice
"in the form of a crucial misstatement in an official decision." Id. at 57. The court
stated: "Not every form of official misinformation will be considered sufficient to es-
top the government... Yet some forms of erroneous advice are so closely connected to
the basic fairness of the administrative decision making process that the government
may be estopped from disavowing the misstatement." Id. at 56). The requirement of
intent seems to have evolved more recently, as there was no mention or consideration
of the government official's intent in earlier cases in which the court found affirmative
misconduct.
131. 867 F.Supp. 603 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
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with such intent. 136 This point is illustrated by the case of Alaska
Limestone Corp. v. Hodel.137 In that case, the court found that
although the Secretary of the Interior's failure to comply with cer-
tain inventory and reporting deadlines for unpatented mining
claims "merits no applause," the defendant had not made a case
for estoppel because it failed to demonstrate that the Secretary
"intentionally ignored his responsibilities or affirmatively sought
to deceive or mislead ... [defendant] concerning his intentions to
contest the corporation's . . . mining claims."138
The requirement of this extra burden of proof is especially
damaging in the environmental context. As one commentator
aptly observed, "a case would no doubt have to involve truly repre-
hensible government conduct before the court would even consider
upholding an estoppel claim on behalf of a convicted criminal vio-
lator of the environmental laws." 139
IV. Sovereign v. Proprietary Function
A final analytical tool used by courts to determine if estoppel
should lie against the government is an analysis of whether the
government was acting in its sovereign or proprietary capacity. 140
Courts generally favor the estoppel defense when the govern-
ment's activity is classified as proprietary and do not allow the
defense when the government is acting in its sovereign capac-
ity. 141 The government is generally acting in its proprietary func-
tion when it is involved in commercial transactions relating to the
purchase or sale of goods and services and other activities for the
commercial benefit of a particular government agency. 142 The
government is acting in its sovereign role when it carries out
136. See Alaska Limestone Corp. v. Hodel, 614 F.Supp. 642, 647-48 (D.C. Alaska
1985).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 648; See also Hoyl v. Babbitt, 927 F.Supp. 1411, 1417 (D.Colo. 1996)
(BLM officials' expression of optimism of a defendant's chance at getting a suspension
of operations and production under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 does not amount
to affirmative misconduct).
139. Robert D. Daniel, Environmental Law, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 531, 560 (1997)
(citing Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1344 n.7).
140. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see John F. Conway, Note: Equi-
table Estoppel of the Federal Government: An Application of the Proprietary Function
Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 707 (1987).
141. See id. at 708-09.
142. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Harrison, 735 F.2d 408, 411 (11th Cir. 1984).
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unique governmental functions for the benefit of the entire
public.143
In the natural resources and environmental law context,
courts have held that sovereign functions include the act of grant-
ing a permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,' 44
the exercising of eminent domain power, 145 and the preservation
of the government's interest in public trust land. 146 The govern-
ment's proprietary functions, on the other hand, include enforcing
a private contract to gain new title to lands. 147
V. The Future of the Estoppel Defense after Office of
Personnel Management v. Richmond
In the context of cases involving natural resource and envi-
ronmental issues, it appears that litigants enjoyed the greatest
amount of success in the application of the doctrine during the
late 1970's and early 1980's.148 Working in a litigant's favor is
Supreme Court dicta which suggests that there may be some cir-
cumstances in which the United States is estopped because of the
conduct of its officials.' 49 However, the court's prior statements in
dicta have "taken on something of a life of ... [their] own" in the
lower courts, who have grasped onto this language as an invita-
tion to find the right case in which to apply the doctrine. 150 At the
same time, courts are increasing their reliance on policy consider-
ations based on the separation of powers and protection of the
public interest to reject estoppel defenses.' 51
Most discouraging for the future vitality of the defense is the
Supreme Court's most recent decision on estoppel, Office of Per-
sonnel Management v. Richmond. 52 In Richmond, the Court had
143. See id.
144. See Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding
that the granting of a permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is an
exercise of the government's sovereign power to protect the public interest in environ-
mental safety and quality).
145. See United States v. 0.5 Acre of Land, More or Less, 228 F.Supp. 674, 675
(E.D. Tenn. 1962); See also Utah Power, 243 U.S. at 391.
146. See State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 36, 41-42 (N.D. Calif.
1981).
147. See Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 101.
148. See, e.g., Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 97, Eaton
Shale Co., 433 F.Supp. at 1272, and Morton, 370 F.Supp. at 124.
149. See Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60; see also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785
(1981); Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8; Kennedy, 366 U.S. at 314-15.
150. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 421-22.
151. See id.
152. 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
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no positive remarks for application of the doctrine against the gov-
ernment. 15 3 Although the Court refrained from holding that gov-
ernment is absolutely immune from the doctrine, it pointed out
that not only has it reversed every finding of estoppel against the
government that it has reviewed, significantly, three of these deci-
sions were summary reversals, which are highly unusual.154 Fur-
thermore, the Court went so far as to place a complete bar on the
application of the doctrine against the government when the effect
would be to grant a party a money remedy that Congress has not
authorized. 55 As one commentator has stated, the Richmond de-
cision sends "a strong message to the lower courts to evaluate
claims of estoppel against the government with disfavor and to
focus on the limits of their own power to estop the government."'1 56
The decision has indeed seemed to have had a chilling effect on
the lower courts presented with estoppel post-Richmond, who
have questioned the vitality of the defense in government cases. 5 7
Estoppel against the government has since been characterized as
a defense that is nearly "impossible," with one court warning de-
fendants who wish to assert the defense that they have an "an
uphill battle."'158
VI. Conclusion
While recent cases may cast a dim light on the defense of es-
toppel, the Supreme Court's continued refusal to place a complete
bar on the doctrine in government cases makes it critical to under-
stand the contours of the defense. 59 In evaluating the merits of
153. See id.
154. Id. at 422.
155. Id. at 433.
156. Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term Leading
Cases, 104 HARv. L. REV. 286, 296 (1990).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Krilich, 126 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
it significant that the Court in Richmond made note of the fact that it had reversed
every finding of estoppel that it has reviewed); Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at
1348 (noting that the Richmond decision "cast further doubt on the proposition that
equitable estoppel runs against the United States"); In re DePaolo, 45 F.3d 373, 376-7
(10th Cir. 1995)("It is far from clear that the Supreme Court would ever allow an
estoppel defense against the government under any set of circumstances."); Jana, Inc.
v. United States, 936 F.2d 1265, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that after Richmond it
is not entirely clear whether the defense of estoppel is still available against the
government).
158. Krilich, 126 F.3d at 1037.
159. Even so, administrative law judges have not been averse to estopping the im-
proper cases. See, e.g., Floyd Higgins, supra note 120.
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an estoppel defense, a practitioner should consider the following
questions:
(1) Would the application of estoppel compel an action not au-
thorized by Congress?
(2) Would the application of estoppel require the government to
make a monetary payment not authorized by Congress?
(3) Was the act or information upon which your client relied
within the scope of the authority of the government agent?
(4) Does the private interest at stake outweigh the damage to
the public interest of estopping the government?
(5) Did your client rely on oral representations of government
officials?
(6) Did your client have a duty to inquire based on other facts
within the client's knowledge?
(7) Did the government engage in affirmative misconduct with
an ill intent to do so?
(8) Was the government acting in its sovereign or proprietary
capacity?
OTHER COMMON LAW EQUITABLE DEFENSES:
LACHES, WAIVER AND UNCLEAN HANDS
I. Laches
A. Introduction
Like estoppel, the defense of laches is based on notions of fair-
ness. 160 It is a doctrine "by which relief is denied to one who has
unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in the assertion of a
claim."161 It is derived from the equitable principle that courts
will not assist one who has slept on his or her rights where the
failure to act is to the detriment of another. 162 The doctrine also
recognizes society's need for "speedy vindication or enforcement of
rights, so that courts may arrive at safe conclusions as to the
truth."163
160. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668
F.2d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 1982).
161. Brundage v. United States, 504 F.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1974). The defense of
laches can be intertwined with the defense of estoppel, as some courts are of the view
that the "essence of laches is estoppel." Id.; See also United States v. Gates of the
Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 788, 798 (1983). The Gates court
stated that a party's failure to establish the requirements for estoppel eliminates the
foundation for a laches defense. See id.
162. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
163. Id.
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B. Elements of Laches
To assert the defense of laches, one must show (i) an unrea-
sonable and unexcused delay by the party against whom the de-
fense is asserted, and (ii) prejudice to the party asserting the
defense..64 With respect to the first element, it is important to
note that the mere fact that time has elapsed from the date a
cause of action first accrued is not sufficient to bar a suit under
the doctrine of laches. 165 Rather, the delay must be unreasonable
and unexcused. 166 Furthermore, the prejudice element of this test
includes either economic prejudice or defense prejudice, which is
an "impairment of the ability to mount a defense due to circum-
stances such as loss of records, destruction of evidence or witness
unavailability. "167
C. Policy Considerations
It is well-settled that the defense of laches is generally inap-
plicable against the government when the government is enforc-
ing its rights. 168 The policy behind prohibiting the defense of
laches to be asserted against the government is to protect the
"public rights, revenues and property"' 69 from being lost for the
sole reason that the agencies of the government were negligent in
protecting those rights. 70 The prohibition against application of
the defense of laches against the government is particularly ad-
hered to in environmental cases, where the government "is acting
in its sovereign capacity to enforce and protect the public interest
in a clean environment."' 71 Accordingly, many courts have re-
fused to consider the defense of laches when asserted against the
government. 72 For example, courts have held that the doctrine of
laches does not bar the Environmental Protection Agency from re-
covering for violations of pretreatment regulations and violation of
164. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); see also United States
v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1999).
165. See, e.g., Costello, 365 U.S. at 282.
166. See Melrose Assoc., L.P. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 124 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
167. Jana, 936 F.2d at 1269-70.
168. See, e.g., Costello, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); United States v. Summerlin, 310
U.S. 414, 416-17 (1940); United States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 619 (6th Cir.
1979).
169. Costello, 365 U.S. at 281 (citations omitted).
170. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); See also, Mary
Lynn Kelly, Preventing Trial by Ambush: The Laches Defense in Title VII Suits, 8 REV.
LITIG. 227 (1989).
171. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F.Supp. at 1138.
172. See id.
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a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem 173 or from recovering for violations of the Clean Air Act.
174
The doctrine of laches will also not bar the Bureau of Reclamation
of the Department of Interior from charging districts for expenses
incurred by the Army Corps of Engineers for the operation and
maintenance of a dam and reservoir, which supply districts with
water.175 In addition, laches will not bar the government from en-
forcing its rights concerning public lands. 176
Other courts, however, have not interpreted the Supreme
Court and other precedent as a per se rule against asserting laches
against the government in all circumstances. 77 For example, in
United States v. Eaton Shale Co.,' 7 8 the United States brought an
action against successors in interest of a land patent to invalidate
and cancel the patent on the ground that six oil placer mining
claims upon which the patent was premised were not in existence
at the time the patent was issued. 79 The court found that laches
was a "viable and persuasive defense" against the government in
light of the fact that at the time the patent was issued, the govern-
ment had full knowledge of the facts necessary to cancel the pat-
ent at the time of its issuance. 80 The court noted that the
government waited twenty-one years to attack the patent, during
which time the defendant had expended a substantial amount of
money for the use and maintenance of the land.' 81 The court also
noted that the lapse in time had further disadvantaged the defen-
dant due to the unavailability of witnesses, the difficulty in locat-
ing documents and the inability to reconstruct the facts.18 2
173. See Menominee, 727 F.Supp. at 1122.
174. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F.Supp. at 1138.
175. See Bostwick Irrigation District v. United States, 900 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (8th
Cir. 1990).
176. See California, 332 U.S. at 40.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Martell, 844 F. Supp. 454, 459 (1994) (Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that laches may be asserted against the government); Jana, 936 F.2d at
1269 (stating that it is not clear whether the defense of laches may be asserted
against the government but not deciding the question definitively); S.E.R., Jobs for
Progress, Inc. v. United States, 759 F.2d 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the court considered the
application of the doctrine against the government by assuming without deciding that
such a defense may be brought against the government); United States v. Rhodes, 788
F.Supp. 339 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (finding that an exception lies where the government
brings an action in contract where the defense of laches is applicable to the govern-
ment's predecessor in interest).
178. 433 F.Supp. 1256 (D. Colo. 1977).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
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II. Waiver
A. Introduction
Waiver is often applied as a defense against the government
in conjunction with estoppel.18 3 Courts disfavor the use of waiver
as a defense against the government for the same public policy
reasons that estoppel is disfavored.184 Courts have held that, gen-
erally, "public officials have no power or authority to waive the
enforcement of the law on behalf of the public." 18 5
B. Elements of Waiver
A party asserting the defense of waiver must establish either
an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege,"18 6 or, if alleging implied waiver, "a clear, unequivo-
cal and decisive act.., showing a purpose to abandon or waive the
legal right."18 7 Regardless of whether a waiver is express or im-
plied, it must be intentional.18 8 Mere negligence will not create a
waiver.18 9 In addition, rights or privileges may only be waived by
the person for whose benefit they were intended, 90 by his agent 191
or by someone else whom the law empowers to act on his behalf.192
The question of whether the government has waived its claims is
one of fact,' 93 and is usually a highly fact-specific inquiry to each
individual case. Whether a particular right may be waived de-
pends on the right at stake. 94 It is important to note, however
183. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F.Supp. 397 (1991); United States v.
Walerko Tool and Eng'g Corp., 784 F.Supp. 1385 (1992); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 801 F.Supp. 1309 (1992).
184. See Mottolo, 695 F.Supp. at 628 (citing Albrechtson v. Andrus, 570 F.Supp.
906, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1970)).
185. United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F.Supp. 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
See also Atlantic Richfield v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 587, 591-92 (10th Cir. 1970).
186. Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1970). For an application,
see e.g. Mottolo, 695 F.Supp. at 628 (finding that the government had not waived its
right to pursue an action for the recovery of cleanup costs under CERCLA because at
the time the government representation was made CERCLA had not yet been
enacted).
187. United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275, 282 (9th Cir. 1963).
188. See Alsens Am. Portland Cement Works v. Degnon Contracting Co., 118 N.E.
210 (N.Y. 1917).
189. See id.
190. See United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Miller, 34 S.W.2d 938 (1931).
191. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
192. See Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Rankin, 98 S.W.2d (1936).
193. See Walerko Tool, 784 F.Supp. at 1389.
194. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
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that, in general, a statutory right cannot be waived if such waiver
would violate public policy. 195
III. Unclean Hands
A. Introduction
Like the other defenses at common law, the doctrine of un-
clean hands is based on conscience and good faith. 196 The princi-
ple underlying the doctrine of unclean hands is that "since equity
tries to enforce good faith in defendants, it no less stringently de-
mands the same good faith from the plaintiff."197 Thus, the
maxim guiding the doctrine of unclean hands is "he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands."198 The Supreme Court
has characterized the doctrine as "a self-imposed ordinance that
closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with ine-
quitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks
relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defen-
dant."1 99 Although unlike the doctrines of estoppel and laches,
there is no general prohibition against asserting this defense in
government actions, it has been held that the doctrine should not
be applied to frustrate the purpose of a federal statute or to
thwart public policy. 200
B. Elements of Unclean Hands
The only requirement for asserting an unclean hands defense
is to show that the alleged inequitable conduct has some relation-
ship to the matters before the court in the present case. 201 Thus,
"[wihile equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
blameless lives, it does require that they shall have acted fairly
and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue."202 As
with the other common law defenses, the determination of
195. See Haghighi v. Russian-American Broad. Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1088 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted).
196. See Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d at 103.
197. 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2946 at 108 (1995).
198. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
199. Id.
200. See Martell, 844 F.Supp. at 459.
201. See In re New Valley Corp. v. Corporate Property Ass'n 2 and 3, 181 F.3d 517
(3d Cir. 1999).
202. Precision, 324 U.S. at 814-15 (citation omitted).
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whether relief is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands is within
the discretion of the trial court. 20 3
An example of the application of this doctrine in a govern-
ment case may be found in United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co. 20 4
There, the government brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment and specific performance of a contract, which had been en-
tered into over thirty years earlier. 20 5 Under the contract, the
owner of certain timberlands was required to donate part of the
land if the boundaries of an adjacent national forest were ex-
tended to include the land.20 6 The boundaries were extended. 20 7
However, a subsequent public land order was issued retracting
this initial extension. 208 The government made no assertion of
ownership for several years and, in the meantime, the defendant
made considerable improvements upon the land.20 9 When the
government finally made its claim of ownership to the retracted
lands, the court found, in addition to other defenses, that defen-
dant had established unclean hands by the government based on
the government's failure to inform the defendant that the bounda-
ries set forth in the order were invalid or, alternatively, by not
informing the defendant that it would repudiate the changes ef-
fected by the order.210
ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT
I. Introduction
Statutory limitation provisions are enacted by Congress
based upon the same policy considerations which underlie the
common law equitable defenses. 21' Statutes of limitations are, in
fact, very similar to the doctrine of laches. Both are designed to
promote fairness by precluding the revival of claims "that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
203. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 245-46 (1933)
("when assessing whether to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands, courts of equity
must not be bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel
the free and just exercise of discretion." ). See also New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d at 525.
204. 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 103.
210. See id. at 104.
211. See United States v. Laneman, 1998 WL 315346, at *4 (D. Minn. 1998).
20001 301
29
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. '" 212 In the context of
government cases, the general rule is that the government is not
subject to any time constraints in bringing its actions. 213 How-
ever, in the 1960's Congress narrowed the application of this rule
by enacting general statutory limitation provisions that apply to
government actions.214 By placing limits on the government's
ability to litigate, Congress has expressed a policy of protecting a
party's right to be free of stale claims in certain circumstances,
even where the government is acting on behalf of the public. 215
The statutory nature of the defense mandates a different
analysis than the analysis required for asserting common law de-
fenses against the government. In these cases the court does not
engage in a balancing of competing interests because, in enacting
the statute, Congress has already struck such a balance. Rather,
application of a particular statute of limitation usually depends
upon the court's interpretation of the express provisions of the
statute. The discussion set forth below explores the contours of the
application of the statutes of limitations when asserted against
the government, including issues such as accrual and tolling, that
a practitioner must consider when evaluating this defense. The
focus of this section is on statute of limitations against the federal
government. However, many of the same statutory construction
principles will apply in the state and local government context. 21 6
II. The General Rule
When considering whether a statute of limitations defense is
viable against the government for your particular facts, it is im-
portant to remember that the general rule is that the government,
when acting in its sovereign capacity, is not subject to any time
limitations for bringing a claim, absent a congressional enactment
to the contrary. 217 This rule derives from the historic prerogative
212. Order of R. Tel. v. Ry. E. Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
213. See Flake v. United States, 1996 WL 437509, at *3
214. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 2415.
215. See Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 136.
216. See, e.g., Town of Cyril v. Mobil Oil Corp., 11 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1993); Gibbs
v. Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994) (both hold-
ing that the general rule against applicability of statutes of limitation to the govern-
ment applies to state).
217. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924); United
States v. Ward, 985 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1993). This rule applies whether the
government brings an action in federal or state court. Summerlin, 310 U.S. at 416.
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of the Crown. 218 Like the common law defense of laches, the rule's
continuing vitality is attributed to the public policy of preserving
"the public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss
[from] the negligence of public officers." 219
In light of the Congressional enactment of limitation periods
which are applicable against the government, however, the gen-
eral rule now applies only in the narrow circumstances where (i)
the statute under which the government brings its action does not
provide an express time limitation for filing suit; and (ii) the court
determines that no general statute of limitations is applicable. 220
An illustration of the type of case in which the general rule still
applies is in actions brought by the government under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA").221 In such
cases, courts have consistently held that the government is not
constrained by time limitations in bringing its actions because the
act does not provide a limitation provision and the actions do not
fall within the scope of the general statute of limitations provi-
sions applicable to the government. 222
The general rule has been severely limited by Congress' en-
actment of specific limitation provisions in individual acts and its
enactment of general statutes of limitation applicable to the gov-
ernment. 223 One of these provisions will potentially apply in most
cases. Yet, as discussed below, these provisions can be narrowly
construed so as to not apply in certain cases, leaving the govern-
ment with no time limits within which it must seek recovery.
It is important to begin a discussion of these two types of situ-
ations with a review of a few rules of construction that apply to
any statute of limitations which governs actions brought by the
government. First, and perhaps most importantly, all statute of
limitations will be strictly construed in favor of the govern-
ment.224 This rule encourages courts to interpret statutes of limi-
218. See Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. at 132.
219. Id.; See also United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339-
40 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining the doctrine of limitation immunity by the government
as being based on the "public policy objective of protecting rights vested in the govern-
ment for the benefit of all from the inadvertence of the agents upon which the govern-
ment must rely.").
220. See United States v. Tri-No Enterprises, Inc., 819 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1987).
221. 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1994).
222. See, e.g., Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d at 159; United States v. E. & C. Coal
Co., Inc., 647 F.Supp. 268, 274 (W.D. Va. 1986); United States v. Hawk Contracting,
Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
223. See Guaranty, 304 U.S. at 136.
224. See Badaracco v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984).
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tations in a manner which favors inapplicability to a claim
brought by the government.225 Another rule of construction is
that a court will look to the substance of the claim, rather than its
trappings, to determine whether and which statute of limitations
provision is applicable. 226 Therefore, a defendant's efforts to char-
acterize the facts as within the scope of a general statutes of limi-
tations provisions will often be rejected by the court.227 Finally,
on a narrower note, in some jurisdictions, citizen groups are con-
sidered to stand in the shoes of the government when the group
brings an action as a private attorney general, and therefore, the
group will be treated like the government for purposes of statute
of limitations.228
III. Statute of Limitations Expressly Set Forth in
Individual Acts
When a party is being sued by the government, one of the first
things that the party must do is consider the Act which has au-
thorized the government suit. In some cases, the Act under which
the government has asserted a claim includes its own express lim-
itation provisions which may affect the government's ability to
bring the claim.
225. See id.
226. See United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1975).
227. See, e.g., Tri-No Enterprises, 819 F.2d at 158. In Tri-No Enterprises, the court
rejected the argument that an action brought to collect fees under SMCRA was an
action for civil penalties, and therefore subject to the statute of limitations in 28
U.S.C. § 2462, on the basis that the fees under SMCRA are not penalties. This case
also illustrates a court's narrow interpretation of statute of limitations in favor of the
government.
228. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F.Supp. 440 (D.
Md. 1985). In that case the court found that a citizen suit instituted under § 505 of
the Clean Water Act was subject to the five year limitations period in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462, which applies to government actions for civil penalties. The rationale stated
by the court would be applicable to citizen suits initiated under other environmental
statutes as well. The court stated:
[T]he plaintiffs are suing as private attorneys general, and they seek en-
forcement of federal law. Although the [Clean Water Act] provides that a
citizen 'sues on his own behalf,' any penalties recovered from such an ac-
tion are paid into the United States Treasury .... Any benefit from the
lawsuit, whether injunctive or monetary, inures to the public or to the
United States. The citizen suit provision was designed to supplement ad-
ministrative enforcement, not to prove a private remedy. Under these
circumstances it seems most appropriate that the same statute of limita-
tions applies to a civil action as to a federal administrative action.
Id. at 449-50.
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A. Examples of Acts that Include Statute of Limitations
Provisions
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) is one example of such an Act. 229
When CERCLA was originally enacted, it was not clear whether
actions brought by the government under § 107 of the act for the
recovery of cleanup costs were subject to a statute of limita-
tions. 230 In 1987, Congress resolved the uncertainty with amend-
ments that imposed a three-year period for bringing removal
actions and a six year period for bringing remedial actions. 231
Pursuant to these provisions, claims brought by the government
under § 107 of CERCLA that fall outside these time limitations
will be barred.232
Another example of Congressional intent to limit the govern-
ment in particular actions may be found in the Federal Oil and
Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996 (FOGR-
SFA).233 These amendments to the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act of 1982,234 imposed upon the government a
seven-year deadline in which it may bring a claim for collection of
royalty payments. 235 The drafters made clear their intent for this
to be the sole limitation period to be applied in such cases by pro-
viding that "Itihe limitations set forth in sections 2401, 2415,
2416, and 2462 of [28 U.S.C.] and section 42 of the Mineral Leas-
ing Act 236 shall not apply to any obligation to which this Act ap-
plies."237 Enactment of FOGRSFA was driven, in part, by the
inconsistency among judicial and administrative decisions inter-
229. For an in-depth discussion of the limitation provisions set forth in CERCLA,
see Johnson, Application of Statute of Limitations (42 U.S.C.S. § 9613(g)(2)) in Action
Under § 107 of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)(42 U.S.C.S. § 9607) for Recovery of Costs for Removal of Remedial Ac-
tion, 142 A.L.R. Fed. 115 (1997).
230. See United States v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 766 F.Supp. 405, 415 (D. Md.
1991).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1994).
232. See id.
233. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 97-451, 110 Stat. 1700 (1996).
234. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1994).
235. 30 U.S.C. § 1724(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "A judicial proceeding or
demand which arises from, or relates to an obligation, shall be commenced within
seven years from the date on which the obligation becomes due and if no so com-
menced shall be barred."
236. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1994).
237. 30 U.S.C. § 1724(b)(3) (1996).
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preting whether the general statute of limitations for contracts
under 28 USC § 2415(a) applied. 238
B. Accrual of Actions under Statute of Limitations in Specific
Acts
The practitioner should be aware that determining when the
government claim accrued under these specific statutory provi-
sions can be critical to the success of this defense. In some cases,
the Act includes provisions addressing the accrual date. 239 For ex-
ample, FOGRSFA provides that the royalty obligation becomes
due "for any given production month for a lease.., on the last day
of the calendar month following the month in which oil and gas is
produced."240 This definition provides for certainty as to the ac-
tual accrual date for each monthly royalty payment in line with
judicial precedent. 241
In other cases, the court must determine the date the cause of
action accrued. 242 Depending upon the accrual date applied by
the court, the government's claim may not be time-barred. For ex-
ample, in United States v. United Nuclear Corp.,243 the court
found the EPA's action under CERCLA for clean-up costs timely
under the three year limitation in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g), because the
EPA's cause of action did not accrue (and therefore the three year
limitation period began to run) until the EPA issued its record of
decision signing off on the final clean-up. 244 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the three year period began to run
much earlier when the EPA commenced its clean-up activities. 245
In finding the latest possible accrual date applicable, the court re-
lied upon "sound public policies" 246 and the rule that CERCLA
238. See Section IV.B.2., infra.
239. See 30 U.S.C. § 1724(c) (1996).
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1993)
("Phillips III") (rejecting the government's contention that the royalty claim did not
accrue under § 2415 (a) until after the government conducted an audit); Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. Lujan, 811 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Okla. 1992).
242. See United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F.Supp. 1552 (D. N.M. 1992).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. The earliest possible accrual date is the enactment of § 9613(a) be-
cause courts have ruled that the statute of limitations in § 9613(g) has prospective
application only. See United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622, 625-26 (E.D. Va.
1988); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 437 (D. N.J. 1991).
246. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. at1552.
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limitations periods "must be construed strictly in favor of the
government."247
IV. The General Statutes of Limitation Applicable Against
the Government
Where the particular Act that forms the basis for the govern-
ment's claim does not contain a specific limitation period, one of
the general statutes of limitation may be applicable. There are
three significant general limitations statutes applicable against
claims by the government: 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (providing a six
year limit for government claims for money damages under con-
tracts); 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (providing a three year limit for gov-
ernment claims for money damages based on torts); and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 (providing a five year limit for government claims for fines
and civil penalties).
Congress enacted § 2462 in 1948 and § 2415 in 1966.248 The
purpose of § 2415 was "to provide a more balanced and fair treat-
ment of litigants in civil actions involving the government."249 As
expressed by the Comptroller General in his supporting statement
accompanying the Senate report, "[plersons dealing with the Gov-
ernment should have some protection against an action by the
Government when the act occurred many years previously."250
Congress enacted § 2415 "to promote fairness... notwithstanding
whatever prejudice might accrue thereby to the Government as a
result of the negligence of its officers." 251 Congress believed that
"modern standards of fairness and equity" demanded "equality of
treatment" for private litigants defending government claims. 252
In recent years, courts have been increasingly willing to find,
for certain categories of claims, that in the absence of a specific
statutory time bar, the general limitation statutes against the
247. Id.
248. See 28 U.S.C. § 2642 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1994).
249. S. Rep. No. 1328 at 7 (1966) reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2503 ("[Tlhe
Government litigation covered by the bill arises out of activity which is very similar to
that commercial activity. Many of the contract and tort claims asserted by the Gov-
ernment are almost indistinguishable from claims made by private individuals
against the Government.").
250. Id. at 2508.
251. United States v. Hanover Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1996) quoting
S.E.R. Jobs for Progress, 759 F.2d at 18.
252. The legislative history indicates that the same equitable notions driving stat-
utes of limitation in other contexts, such as requiring claimants to assert their claims
when memories of witnesses were fresh and documents and other evidence still avail-
able, were driving Congress to pass these bills. See 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2503.
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government applies.253 For example, where the government
brings an action for recovery of cleanup costs under the Clean
Water Act, which, unlike CERCLA, does not contain an express
limitations period for cost-recovery actions, the government is still
required to bring the action within six years pursuant to
§ 2415(a).254
As discussed more fully below, however the statutory inter-
pretation of the language of these general statutes can often con-
stitute difficult or impossible hurdles for the practitioner
attempting to apply the limitations defense to a particular govern-
ment claim.
A. Application of the General Statutes of Limitation to Natural
Resources and Environmental Claims
When promulgated, none of these general statutes contem-
plated the many types of natural resources and environmental
claims being raised today. Nor did these statutes anticipate the
intricate administrative processes now in place for such agencies
as the Department of Interior. Therefore, the statutory language
of these general limitation statutes is often problematic or ambig-
uous in these contexts. In the authors' view, these uncertainties
permit courts to construe statutory language so as to weigh in
favor of the agency depending, in part, upon the equities of the
situation. In some contexts, seemingly inconsistent decisions
among courts must also be reconciled in order to prevail with the
defense.
As a threshold matter, determining the nature of the govern-
ment's claim may derail a limitations based defense if the court
declines to find that the particular claim falls within the intended
scope of the general statute. For example, in § 2415(a) contract
cases, the practitioner must first persuade the court that the par-
ticular monies being claimed by the government are based in con-
tract or quasi-contract within the meaning of § 2415 before that
limitations period applies. 255 If that threshold test is met, the lim-
itations period may still not apply if, for example, the claim is
brought in an administrative rather than judicial forum 256 or if
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), (b); 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2416(a) (1994).
255. Both express and implied contracts are within the scope of § 2415(a). The six
year limitation period applies to "any contract express or implied in law or fact..." See
also Neidorf, 522 F.2d at 919.
256. See, e.g., Woods Research and Dev. Corp., 148 IBLA 121, GFS(O&G) 16 (1999).
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the monetary remedy is sought with other relief such as an injunc-
tion.25 7 Furthermore, even if the limitations period does apply, it
may not have run to bar the government's claim if the accrual date
of the claim is disputed 258 or if the limitations period is "tolled" by
certain circumstances such as a government audit.259 In order to
actually prevail with a statute of limitations defense, the practi-
tioner must overcome all of these hurdles. 260
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 Contract or Tort Actions for Money
Damages
Determining whether a particular claim is within the scope of
the statute of limitations found in § 2415(a) or § 2415(b) can be
difficult. Likewise, construction of the terms "action" and "money
damages" utilized in both subparts, can cause rejection of the oth-
erwise viable defense.
28 U.S.C. § 2415 provides in pertinent part:
(a) ... every action for money damages brought by the United
States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any
contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless
the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action
accrues or within one year after final decisions have been ren-
dered in applicable administrative proceedings required by con-
tract or law, whichever is later....
(b) . .. every action for money damages brought by the United
States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a
tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three
years after the right of action accrues....
In addition to the above, § 2415 contains a number of other sub-
parts, many of which contain exceptions to the general rules.261
These should be carefully evaluated by the practitioner at the
time of analyzing these defenses. All of these subsections must
also be read in conjunction with the tolling provisions set forth in
§ 2416 for a complete analysis.
257. See Part IV.C.3., infra.
258. See United Nuclear Corp., 814 F.Supp. 1552.
259. See Phillips III, 4 F.3d at 861-64.
260. See id.
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1998).
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1. Whether the Government's Claim is Based In Tort or
Contract
Whether the federal government's claim is based in contract
or in tort theories is not always readily determinable. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., Ltd.,262 the govern-
ment's claim against the company was brought under the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c), for reimbursement of remediation
costs, necessitated by a fuel spill off the coast of Alaska.263 The
company argued that the three-year tort limitation period applied
because the claim was based upon polluting the sea.264 The gov-
ernment argued that since the Act was silent, no limitations pe-
riod applied. 265 In the alternative, the government argued for the
six-year limitation period under a theory of quasi-contract. 266 At
the district court level, the company prevailed on its theory and
the complaint was dismissed.267 In overturning the district court,
the Ninth Circuit first rejected the contention that no statute of
limitations applied.268 It also disagreed that the government's
claim was based in tort.269 Instead, the Court held the six-year
limitations period applicable, because a contract impliedly existed
between the company and the government under § 1321(c) of the
Act to reimburse the government for clean up costs 270 In the Ap-
pellate Court's view, any other result would be inequitable and
unjustly enrich the company for failing its duty to remediate the
spill.271 Thus, the longer six-year period applied and the claim
was not barred.272
262. 794 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1986).
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. The court relied upon its earlier rulings where it held that "whenever the
United States sues for damages, the substance of the claims must be characterized for
purposes of section 2415 as sounding in either tort, contract or quasi-contract."
United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799, 901 (9th Cir.1975).
269. See Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392.
270. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit in United States v. P!
B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. C.&R. Trucking
Co., 537 F.Supp. 1080 (N.D. W.Va. 1982).
271. See Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392.
272. The Ninth Circuit went on to hold, in the alternative, that the 3-year limita-
tions period would also not have run, because the government's claim accrued on the
date when the clean up was completed, not on the date the polluting activities oc-
curred. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d at 1395. This case is a good example of how
frustrating it can be to successfully assert a statute of limitations defense against the
federal government.
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In other natural resources contexts, courts have refused to ap-
ply § 2415 at all.273 Under SMCRA, coal miners must pay a recla-
mation fee upon each ton of coal produced.27 4 While the Act
provides for civil actions to recover delinquent fees, it does not
place any restrictions on such actions.27 5 In considering actions
brought by the government under SMCRA for recovery of delin-
quent fees, the courts have followed the general rule that the gov-
ernment is exempt from statutes of limitations.27 6 The courts
reached this conclusion after determining that SMCRA provides
no explicit limitation period for bringing an action and rejecting
arguments that any other general statute of limitations ap-
plied.277 The reclamation fees were held to not be fines, penalties
or forfeitures under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, but rather simple assess-
ments on coal produced for sale by mining.278 Nor were the claims
for delinquent fees based in contract or quasi-contract under
§ 2415(a).27 9 Finally, courts have also rejected the argument that
the SMCRA fee is a tax, subject to the limitations period set forth
in the Internal Revenue Code. 280 However, to the extent that the
government sought civil penalties in addition to the delinquent
fees, the five year statute of limitations at § 2462 would be appli-
cable to that portion of the claim.281
2. Application of Section 2415 to Administrative
Proceedings: Whether the Government's Claim is an
"Action for Money Damages"
One of the most significant statutory construction hurdles fac-
ing a practitioner trying to enforce the general statutes of limita-
273. See Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d at 1392.
274. See 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1994).
275. See id.
276. See, e.g., Tri-No Enterprises, Inc., 819 F.2d at 159; Hawk Contracting, Inc.,
649 F.Supp. at 3.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. However, in one case a district court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)
did apply based again upon equitable principles of quasi-contract. See United States
v. Gary Bridges Logging & Coal Co., 570 F.Supp. 531, 532-33 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). In
this case the defendant had acknowledged owing the fees and entered into an install-
ment contract with the government to repay the debt. The court found that install-
ment contract triggered the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The application of
§ 2415(a) did not alter the outcome of the case, however, because the court found that
the action was not time-barred. Id.
280. See, e.g., Tri-No Enterprises, Inc., 819 F.2d at 159; Hawk Contracting, Inc.,
649 F.Supp. at 3.
281. See Arch Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, 104 F.3d 660, 668 (4th Cir. 1997).
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tion, is their application to agency proceedings outside of the
judicial context. In other words, do the general statutes of limita-
tion apply against agency claims in administrative proceedings as
well as judicial? Where the government raises its claim in a court,
it is readily determinable whether the "action"2 2 is one for
"money damages."28 3 Likewise, that the government commenced
the action by filing a "complaint."28 4 However, under administra-
tive schemes permitting the agency to make claims for monies
owed through administrative orders, and requiring defendants to
appeal those orders through an administrative review process, a
significant question arises concerning whether those claims are
within the scope of § 2415 as "actions for money damages."285
An example of this sort of agency scheme is, of course, the
United States Department of the Interior. One of Interior's sub-
agencies, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), is charged
with the Secretary's authority to enforce the royalty payment
terms of federal oil and gas leases. 28 6 Thus, the MMS routinely
issues administrative orders to lessees to pay additional royalties
on production from past periods. Under MMS regulations, the
lessee must first exhaust a two-tier administrative appeals pro-
cess, prior to challenging the order in district court.28 7 Given this
regulatory scheme, the issue of whether the six-year time bar in
§ 2415(a) applies to administrative as well as judicial proceedings
concerning federal oil and gas leases, has been vigorously litigated
in the royalties context. 288 The resulting decisions have been in-
consistent and unworkable with a number of courts holding
§ 2415(a) applicable to MMS royalty orders,28 9 while others have
flatly rejected that result. 290 Further complicating the situation,
282. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1994).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 30 U.S.C. § 1711 (1994).
287. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 243, 290 (1998).
288. The holding that federal oil and gas leases are contracts within the meaning
of § 2415(a) is well-settled. United States v. Essley, 284 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1960).
289. See Phillips III, 4 F.3d at 860; Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 938 F.Supp. 575
(D. Alaska 1996); cf Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 963 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1992);
Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 17 F.2d 1288
(10th Cir. 1994); Atlantic Richfield Co., 811 F.Supp. at 1522.
290. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, No. 93-1377, WL 484506 (5th Cir. 1994).
In a short, unpublished decision modifying an earlier royalties case, the Fifth Circuit
held that the plain meaning of the language of § 2415(a) was that it was limited to
judicial actions for money damages not MMS royalty orders, citing Bowen v. Massa-
chusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
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the Interior Board of Land Appeals has consistently refused to
find § 2415(a) applicable against Interior Department administra-
tive proceedings, including MMS orders to pay royalties.291 Given
the fact that statutes of limitation are strictly construed in favor
of the government, 292 these results are not that surprising.
The passage of FOGRSFA to provide a seven-year limitation
specifically on both administrative and judicial MMS claims has
resolved this conflict prospectively. 293 Absent such a legislative
fix, however, the practitioner is faced with reconciling the terms
"complaint" and "action for money damages" with the particular
agency administrative scheme at issue.294 This can be an uphill
battle and can lead to patently illogical results where, for the
same claim, the administrative law judge refuses to apply a limi-
tation period, but a court in a judicial context imposes one. The
result may also be unfair, since in the absence of § 2415, the
agency's ability to assert claims, at least administratively, is vir-
tually unlimited. 295
There is also authority to support application of § 2415 in ad-
ministrative proceedings outside of the royalties context. In
United States v. Hanover Ins. Co.,296 the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that § 2415(a) ap-
plied to administrative proceedings. In making this determina-
tion, the Court looked at the structure of the statute as a whole
and held that to carve out administrative proceedings would per-
mit the agency to unfairly avoid the statute of limitations "by
threat of administrative action based exclusively on nonpayment
291. See, e.g., Woods Research and Dev. Corp., 148 IBLA 121, GFS(O&G) 16 (1999).
292. See supra, n. 229.
293. As yet there are no reported administrative or judicial decisions construing
FOGRSFA. The Act is comprehensive and attempts to anticipate the many pitfalls of
a statute of limitations defense in a royalties context by addressing not only when the
cause of action accrues, but also the specific circumstances under which the 7 year
period may be tolled or the amounts claimed as administrative offset. The authors are
certain, however, that over time creative attorneys will raise new and unanticipated
ambiguities in the language of FOGRSFA for courts to grapple with. See id.
294. The legislative history of § 2415 also contains problematic references to "suits
by the government" that are against "private litigants." S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2503.
295. Royalty claim defendants are quick to note that claims for overpaid royalties
which must be brought in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act are subject to a
six year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel,
815 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1987).
296. 82 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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of the time-barred claim."297 A rigorous dissent accompanies the
decision.
3. Accrual of the Cause of Action
The general rule in a contract action is that the cause of ac-
tion accrues at the time of the breach.298 Consistent with that
rule, prior to the enactment of FOGRSFA, royalty payments were
held to accrue one month following the month of production. 299
Where the government claim involves a sequence of payments, the
practitioner should be careful to assert that each monthly pay-
ment accrues separately, in order to avoid a finding that the de-
fendant has waived the defense for the entire period. In other
contexts, courts often construe environmental claims so that the
later possible accrual date under § 2415 applies. 300 As is now
abundantly clear, many courts will find a limitations period appli-
cable, but under the accrual or tolling analysis, ultimately deter-
mine that the statutory period has not yet run.301
4. Tolling
The tolling provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) provides:
For the purpose of computing the limitations periods estab-
lished in § 2415, there shall be excluded all periods during
which . . . facts material to the right of action are not known
and reasonably could not have been known by an official of the
United States charged with the responsibility to act in the cir-
cumstances...
Thus, as long as "facts material to the right of action are not
known and reasonably could not be known by an official of the
United States charged with the responsibility to act in the circum-
stances," the limitations period is tolled.30 2 In the royalty pay-
ment context, this provision has been interpreted to mean that in
297. Id. at 1055.; See also 3M (Minnesota Min. & Manufacturing.) Co. v. Browner,
17 F.3d 1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Suntip, 82 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir.
1996); Reading v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 65 (1926) ("An interpretation of a statute pur-
porting to set a definite limitation upon the time of bringing action... which would
nevertheless leave defendant subject indefinitely to action for the wrong done,
would... defeat its obvious purpose.").
298. See United States v. Kass, 740 F.2d 1493, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984).
299. See Phillips III, 4 F.3d 861.
300. See discussion of Clean Water Act remediation cases, Section IV.B.1, infra.
301. See discussion of Clean Water Act remediation cases, Section IV.B.1, infra.
302. See Kass, 740 F.2d at 1497.
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most instances, the MMS has a "reasonable" period of time to au-
dit the payor's accounts in order to determine that an underpay-
ment exists.30 3 In Phillips III, the Tenth Circuit found that an
evidentiary hearing must be held in each case in order to deter-
mine when the MMS knew or should have known about the defi-
cient royalty payments. 30 4 So long as an audit was commenced
within the FOGRMA six year records retention period, the six
year statute of limitations would be tolled during a reasonably
conducted audit.305 The difficulty with this scheme is that it is
unworkable, causing a royalty payor to anticipate the specific fact
based inquiry necessary for each particular underpayment.
Again, FOGRSFA attempted to address this issue with more
certainty.30 6
5. One Year Savings Clause
28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) contains a further complication, providing
that government claims under contracts must be filed within six
years after the right of action accrues "or within one year after
final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative
proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later."30 7
Government counsel have used this language to argue that the
agency has one year after the conclusion of any administrative
proceedings in which to file its claims.308 This "revival" argument
has been largely rejected, however, with courts limiting applica-
tion of the one year "savings clause" to mandatory administrative
proceedings. 30 9 In one case, the reverse was argued. 310 A royalty
payor asserted the clause to bar an otherwise timely MMS claim
303. But see United Sates v. Gavilan Joint Community College Dist., 849 F.2d 1246
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the legislative history of the tolling provision in § 2416
indicates that it was intended to be limited to circumstances involving fraud).
304. See Phillips III, 4 F.3d at 861.
305. See id.
306. 30 U.S.C. § 1724(d) (1996).
307. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1994).
308. See Kass, 740 F.2d at 1497.
309. The legislative history provides the example of mandatory administrative pro-
ceedings as "those which involve appeals under the 'disputes' clause of government
contracts." S. Rep. No. 89-1328 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2504.
"Tolling the statute for the myriad of permissive administrative proceedings which
are available under current law would offend the statute's goals of barring the govern-
ment from asserting stale claims.. ." United States v. Cocoa Berkau, Inc., 789 F.Supp.
1160 (Ct. Int. Trade 1992) affd 990 F.2d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1993); accord Suntip, 82 F.3d
at 1475; Mitsubishi Elec. Am. Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
310. Mesa Operating, 17 F.3d at 1291.
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after exhaustion of the administrative appeals process.311 The
Tenth Circuit rejected the defense on the grounds that the statute
of limitations defense had never been raised by the plaintiff and
was therefore waived. 312 However, the Court stated further that
"it would be unjust in the extreme to permit the delay through
litigation initiated by plaintiff' to bar an otherwise timely
claim.3 13 The message here is that practitioners must review
§ 2415 as a whole when seeking to prevail on the six year time bar
and be prepared to rebut these various subsections to the extent
practicable.
6. Administrative Offset
It is well-settled that the running of a statute of limitation
merely bars the assertion of a particular remedy outlined in the
statute and does not extinguish the underlying claim.314 Because
the debt itself is not extinguished, other avenues may be available
for its enforcement, such as administrative offset. 315 Section
2415(i) states that "the provisions of this section shall not prevent
the United States or an officer or agency thereof from collecting
any claim of the United States by means of administrative offset,
in accordance with section 3716 of title 31."316 This obscure sub-
section is also fertile ground for confusion and counter arguments.
In the royalties context the topic of administrative offset has now
been amended in FOGRSFA.31 7
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 Actions for Civil Penalties
The statute of limitations provision set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 is much narrower in the scope of its application than
§ 2415. This provision applies only to actions in which the govern-
ment is seeking "civil fines, penalties or forfeiture."318 It requires
the government to bring such actions within five years after the
cause of action has accrued. This statute states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit
or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. See Thomas v. Bennett, 856 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1988).
315. See Roberts v. Bennett, 709 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
316. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(i) (1994).
317. See 30 U.S.C. § 1721(b)(4) (1996).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
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forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained un-
less commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the prop-
erty is found within the United States in order that proper ser-
vice may be made thereon.
As with § 2415, there are a number of issues which may arise
in the application of this limitations period. Whether the particu-
lar facts of the government's claim falls within the scope of § 2462
is again paramount. 319 Additionally, three issues which are com-
mon to many cases warrant particular focus. First, the applicabil-
ity of section 2462 to agency administrative proceedings as well as
judicial proceedings is far more certain under this section than
under § 2415.320 Second, an understanding of when an action ac-
crues under this section is key to successfully prevailing on the
defense. Finally, there is a split of authority in the courts as to
whether § 2462 applies to government claims which request a re-
lief other than money damages. 321
1. Application of § 2462 in Administrative Proceedings
In contrast to cases which involve actions for money damages
under § 2415, a party who is defending an action for civil penalties
or fines brought by the government has a good chance of being
able to assert a statute of limitations defense in administrative
actions.322 The reason is primarily due to the broad language in
§ 2462, which expressly encompasses any "action, suit or proceed-
ing" for civil penalties rather than just an "action" for money dam-
ages.323 Consequently, prior to 1994, courts generally have
assumed that § 2462 is applicable in administrative actions and
319. See, e.g., National Mining Ass'n. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 177 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that so-called "permit blocking" regulations under SMCRA,
permitting the agency to withhold future permits to operators with past uncorrected
violations, were not subject to the five year limitations period in § 2462). This holding
creates a split of authority on the issue. See Arch Mineral Corp., 104 F.3d at 669.
320. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994) with 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1994).
321. Compare United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ute of limitations for government civil enforcement actions does not apply to non-
monetary injunctive relief) with Johnson v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (statute applies equally to pecuniary and nonpecuniary penalties).
322. See United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
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applied the statute without comment. 324 The court in 3M Co.
(Minnesota Min. & Manufacturing.) v. Browner,325 comprehen-
sively considered this issue, however, and its rationale has been
consistently relied upon by later courts that have also faced this
issue.
In 3M, the government brought an action for civil penalties
under the Toxic Substances Control Act against 3M Company for
violations under the act.326 One of the primary issues in the case
was whether § 2462 applied to administrative proceedings. 327 The
issue arose because the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") had
ruled in an earlier proceeding that § 2462 did not apply to admin-
istrative proceedings. 32s The ALJ instead concluded that § 2462
applied only to judicial "actions, suits or proceedings," 329 because
Congress had not intended, through its revision of the statute, to
change the substance of the original language "suit or prosecu-
tion."330 Therefore, the ALJ concluded that even if the EPA's as-
sessment of a civil penalty was a "proceeding," it could not be
considered a "suit or prosecution."331
The appeals court rejected the ALJ's distinction between
these terms, however, noting that the Supreme Court has not
made a distinction between "the function performed by agency at-
torneys 'presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the func-
tion of a prosecutor who brings evidence before a court."' 332
Instead, the court held that there was no justification for making
a distinction in the application of § 2462 depending on whether
the penalty action was brought in a court or in an administrative
agency.333 The court reasoned:
Given the reasons why we have statute of limitations, there is
no discernable rationale for applying § 2462 when the penalty
action or proceeding is brought in court, but not when it is
brought in an administrative agency. The concern that after the
324. See, e.g., Williams v. United States Dep't of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573, 1578 n. 8
(11th Cir. 1986); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 822
(1st Cir. 1965); The A/S Glittre v. Dill, 152 F. Supp. 934, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
325. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1455.
329. Id. at 1456.
330. Id.
331. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456.
332. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978)).
333. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456.
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passage of time 'evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared' pertains equally to factfinding
by a court and factfinding by an agency.33 4
This rationale has been widely accepted by courts that have
since considered the issue. 335 Consequently, a party defending an
action for civil penalties in an administrative proceeding should
be able to assert the defense of statute of limitations if applicable.
2. When a Cause of Action Accrues Under § 2462
The issue of accrual concerns the interpretation of the
§ 2462's phrase "commenced within five years from the date when
the claim first accrued."336 Traditionally, courts have held that a
claim accrues for statute of limitations purposes at the moment
when the plaintiffs rights are violated. 337 However, in the appli-
cation of § 2462 in environmental cases, an argument may be
made that the "discovery rule" of accrual should be applied.338
The theory behind the discovery rule is that in circumstances
where the injuries are latent or difficult to detect, the cause of ac-
tion should not begin to accrue until the injury has been
discovered. 339
This argument has been well-received in Clean Water Act
cases. 340 In actions brought under the Clean Water Act, the
334. Id. at 1457 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349). The court
also relied on the Supreme Court maxim that "In a country where not even treason
can be prosecuted, after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an
individual would remain for ever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture." Id. (citing Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805)(Marshall, C.J.)).
335. See, e.g., Arch Mineral, 104 F.3d at 669; Ballmer v. Babbit, 926 F.Supp. 575
(S.D. W. Va. 1996); In re Britton Constr. Co., 29 Envtl. L. Rptr. 41107 (1999); In re
Harmon Electronics, Inc., 25 Envtl. L. Rptr. 47009, 47013 (1994); In the Matter of
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 24 Envtl. L. Rptr. 40009 (1992).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
337. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971);
see also Sawtell v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 248, 250 (10th Cir. 1994).
338. For an excellent discussion advocating the application of this rule in environ-
mental cases, see James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and The Continuing Viola-
tion Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental
Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589 (1996).
339. See Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal, Co., 935 F.2d 336, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
340. See Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 75 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Material Serv. Corp., 1996 WL 563462
(No. 95 C 3550) (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); United States v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Co., 1993 WL 54155 (Civ. A. No. 91-1428) (W.D. La. April 14, 1993); United States v.
Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 690, 693-94 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, v. United States E.P.A., 806 F.Supp. 1263, 1277 (E.D. Va.
1992); United States v. Hobbs, 736 F.Supp. 1406, 1409 (E.D. Va. 1990); Atlantic
47
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
courts are generally agreed that the cause of action does not ac-
crue until the reports documenting the violation are filed with the
E.P.A.341 The application of the discovery rule in these cases is
based on a concern regarding the difficulty in detecting violations
and a need to further the remedial goals of the Act, as articulated
by the court in Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Spe-
cialty.342 In that case, the court stated:
The plaintiffs first point is that the statute of limitations did
not begin to run when the violations actually occurred, but when
the reports that documented those violations were filed with the
E.P.A. It would have been practically impossible for the plain-
tiff to have discovered the alleged violations of the defendant on
its own. It is only when reports are filed with the E.P.A. that
the public becomes aware that violations have occurred. To hold
that the statute begins to run when violations actually occur, as
opposed to when they are discovered, would impede, if not fore-
close, the remedial benefits of the statute.343
The success of a discovery rule argument in the context of
Clean Water Act cases is not necessarily indicative of whether a
court will accept the argument in any environmental case. At
least one circuit has rejected this argument with respect to appli-
cation of the rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 344 The
3M court also considered this issue in addition to the injunctive
relief issue.345 It rejected the application of the discovery rule in
government penalty actions, finding that the rule was only appro-
priate for cases which involved latent injuries or injuries difficult
to detect.346 The court concluded that the issue of injuries was
irrelevant to penalty actions because the government is author-
ized to bring suit immediately upon a violation, regardless of any
resulting injuries.347 The court also found that:
An agency's failure to detect violations, for whatever reasons,
does not avoid the problems of faded memories,.lost witnesses
and discarded documents in penalty actions brought decades af-
States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F.Supp. 284, 287-88
(N.D.N.Y. 1986).
341. Al Tech, 635 F.Supp. 284.
342. 635 F.Supp. 284, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
343. Id.
344. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994).
345. See 3M, 17 F.3d 1453.
346. See id.
347. See id.
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ter alleged violations are finally discovered. Most importantly,
nothing in the language of § 2462 even arguably makes the run-
ning of the limitations period turn on the degree of difficulty an
agency experiences in detecting violations. 348
The 3M court instead followed other cases in holding that actions
under § 2462 must be commenced within five years of the date of
the violation giving rise to the penalty.3 49
The lack of precedent for the application of the discovery rule
under other environmental acts indicates that this is still an open
issue for suits which involve other acts. A defendant involved in
such an act, therefore, will benefit from relying on the 3M case in
asserting an argument against the application of the discovery
rule.
3. The Application of § 2462 to Government Actions
Requesting Relief Other than Money Damages
When the government brings an action for civil penalties
under § 2462, it often requests injunctive relief in addition to
money damages. 350 When the money damages claim is found to be
barred by the statute of limitations in § 2462, the issue of the stat-
ute's application to the equitable claim for relief may arise. De-
fendants have raised two arguments in support of the theory that
§ 2462 applies to government actions in equity.351 First, a defen-
dant may argue that an injunction or other equitable relief re-
quested constitutes a "penalty" under the statute because of the
detrimental consequences the relief will have on the defendant.352
The Tenth Circuit recently dealt with this issue in United States
v. Telluride Co. 353 In a lengthy discussion rejecting several argu-
ments in support of defendant's construction of the word "penalty"
as used in § 2462, the court found that a sanction is only a penalty
if it "seeks compensation unrelated to, or in excess, of the damages
caused by defendant."354 In that case the court concluded that the
equitable relief requested did not amount to a penalty under
348. Id. at 1461.
349. See id. at 1462; For other cases applying a similar rule, see United States v.
Core Lab, 759 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1985); Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228, 229
(9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Appling, 239 F.Supp. 185, 194-95 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998).
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1246.
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§ 2462 because the relief sought only to restore the property dam-
aged by defendant's actions rather than compensation unrelated
to or in excess of the damages caused by defendant. 355
The court's construction of the word "penalty" as used in
§ 2462 is consistent with the general theory that relief in equity is
remedial, not penal, and therefore § 2462 is inapplicable. 356 The
majority of the courts considering this issue have also concluded
that a sanction that seeks only to remedy the damage caused by
the defendant is not a penalty under § 2462.3 57 Therefore, as long
as the relief requested by the government is directly tied to the
damage caused by the defendant and is aimed at making the in-
jured party whole, the statute of limitations requirements of
§ 2462 will not apply.
An alternative argument that a defendant might assert in
support of the application of § 2462 to a government's claim in eq-
uity is based on the "concurrent remedy rule."358 This rule pro-
vides that "equity will withhold its relief ... where the applicable
statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy."359
The court in United States v. Windward Properties, Inc.360 relied
upon this rule to bar the government's claims for equitable relief
because the government's claims for civil penalties for violations
of the Clean Water Act were barred by § 2462.361 The Windward
case, however, has been criticized for failing to take into account
the general immunity of the government from statute of limita-
tions claims and for not strictly construing the statute in favor of
the government.362 Two recent decisions have rejected the hold-
ing in Windward and concluded that the concurrent remedy rule
cannot be invoked against the government when it seeks equitable
relief.363
355. See Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241.
356. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945). See also
United States v. Hobbs, 736 F.Supp. at 1410 (Court found that § 2462 did not apply to
government claims for injunctive relief because that statute "has no bearing on suits
in equity" Id.).
357. See Telluride Co., 146 F.3d at 1246.
358. See, e.g., United States v. Windward Properties, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 690 (N.D.
Ga. 1993).
359. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947).
360. See Windward, 821 F.Supp. 690.
361. See id.
362. United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997).
363. See Telluride Co., 146 F.3d at 1248-49; Banks, 115 F.3d at 919.
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V. Conclusion
Litigants defending against a government action have a good
chance of successfully asserting the defense of the statute of limi-
tations in a number of natural resources and environmental con-
texts. While the general rule is that the government is not subject
to any time limitations in asserting its claims, Congress' enact-
ment of both specific and general statutes of limitation against the
government results in the application of this rule in only a limited
number of cases. Rather, it is more likely that the government
will be subject to some limitations provision, either a provision
under the governing act or one of the general statute of limita-
tions. However, there are a number of issues that may arise
which can preclude application of the limitations period or se-
verely limit its applicability to the facts of your case. In evaluat-
ing the merits of a statute of limitations defense, a practitioner
should ask the following questions:
(1) Is there a specific statute of limitations applicable to the
action?
(2) If not, do one of the general statutes of limitation apply?
(3) Will the forum the agency's claim is brought in affect appli-
cation of the limitations period?
(4) When did the cause of action accrue?
(5) Has the limitations period been tolled?
(6) Is the government seeking an equitable remedy?
(7) If the administrative proceedings are "mandatory" does the
one year savings clause apply?
(8) Are there administrative offset or recoupment provisions af-
fecting the claim?
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